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Abstract
This Article reviews the experience of developing countries with the regulation of trade in GM
food products in light of such bilateral pressures and argues that there is a need for broader public
participation in the regulation of biotechnology as this will facilitate national governance in an
era in which the international trade regime is rapidly eroding national regulatory decision-making
autonomy. Furthermore, broadening public participation promises to rescue governments of devel-
oping countries from the aforementioned bilateral pressures by helping to strengthen their hands
in negotiations for technical assistance and food aid. That is, developing country governments can
use participatory regulatory frameworks as a negotiation tool by showing either that their policies
are “rooted in ... public support” or that there would be a lack of support for - or even opposi-
tion to - any unsuitable regulatory reforms they are being urged to implement. Part I provides the
Article’s conceptual framework and examines the impact of the WTO’s special and differential
regime on developing countries’ regulatory policy autonomy. Part I also argues that as far as the
regulation of trade in GM foods is concerned, the SDT regime undermines these countries’ policy
autonomy because it facilitates the application of bilateral pressures, and thereby compromises
the establishment of democratic regulatory policies supportive of local priorities. Part II examines
how international regulatory uncertainty has led to the application of bilateral pressures on devel-
oping countries to adopt narrow frameworks for the regulation of trade in GM food products. Part
III examines the role of science in biotechnology regulation and argues that broadening public
participation will facilitate the adoption of regulatory measures that are responsive to local needs
and concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") faces a crisis of le-
gitimacy that has grown since the aborted Seattle Ministerial.'
This crisis has largely revolved around the concern that its deci-
sion-making processes are undemocratic and have led to the
adoption of trade agreements that frustrate the efforts of devel-
oping countries to gain a foothold in international trade and
promote the development of their citizens.2 Developing coun-
tries feel that the international trade regime only serves to rein-
force and exacerbate the vast inequities between rich and poor
countries.
There have therefore been efforts, both within and outside
the WTO, to reform the governance framework of the organiza-
tion so that it can better respond to the needs of developing
countries.4 In particular, these reform efforts seem to proceed
on the premise that the foremost measure that is required to
ensure that the WTO enhances the trade and development of
developing countries is to facilitate their active participation in
* Lecturer in Law, University of Nairobi; J.S.D, LL.M. (Trade Regulation), New
York University; LL.M., University of Cambridge; LL.B., University of Nairobi. I am
grateful to Patricia Kameri-Mbote, who introduced me to the fascinating world of bio-
technology, for comments on a previous draft.
1. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The WTO "Constitution" and Proposed Reforms: Seven
"Mantras" Revisited, 4J. INT'L ECON. L. 67 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the
World Trading System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO, 7J. INT'L
ECON. L. 585 (2004).
3. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 367-76 (2d ed. 1999).
4. See, e.g., Debra P. Steger, Book Review, 5J. INT'L ECON. L. 565 (2002) (reviewing
CLAUDE BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY. THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001)).
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the rule-making and rule-enforcement processes of the WTO. 5
While these efforts are no doubt important, international
trade governance reform initiatives have not sufficiently ac-
knowledged that there are equally important institutional con-
straints operating within developing countries, which also serve
to impede their international trade and development. Foremost
among these impediments are bilateral political and economic
pressures, which serve to erode the policy autonomy of develop-
ing countries to regulate international trade in the interests of
their citizens. In particular, these bilateral pressures take advan-
tage of regulatory uncertainty at the international level to facili-
tate the exploitation of developing countries.
The prevailing regulatory uncertainty over the regulation of
trade in genetically modified ("GM") food products provides an
excellent illustration of this phenomenon. The United States
and the Member States of the European Union ("EU") have
taken almost diametric approaches to the regulation of such
products.6 While the United States has taken the approach that
GM food products are substantially equivalent to their organic
counterparts and should therefore be traded freely, the EU has
adopted a precautionary approach to trade in these products on
the rationale that they may have adverse impacts on human
health and the environment.7 These divergent approaches re-
flect deeply-felt views among the citizens of the United States
and the EU about how their societies should respond to scien-
tific uncertainty.
Because the international regulatory framework does not ef-
fectively govern trade in GM foods, the United States and the EU
have utilized bilateral political and economic pressures to prevail
5. See, e.g., Amrita Narlikar, WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries ix
(Trade-Related Agenda, Dev. and Equity ("T.R.A.D.E.") Working Paper No. 11, 2001)
(arguing that "the only hope that developing countries have of working this elaborate
and powerful system of rules is through active participation in the rule-making and rule-
enforcement processes of the WTO."); Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO
Rule-Making: The Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INrr'L ECON. L. 629, 630
(2004) ("Most academic commentary has focused on enhancing V4TO transparency
and the role of organized civil society.").
6. See, e.g., Ian M. Sheldon, Regulation of Biotechnology: Will We Ever "Freely" Trade
GMOs?, 29 EUR. REv. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 155 (2002); Tim Josling, Who's Afraid of the
GMOs? EU-US Trade Disputes over Food Safety and Biotechnology, Seminar paper presented
at the Ctr. for Int'l Stud. & the Eur. Ctr. of Cal., Univ. of S. Cal., Mar. 11, 1999, available
at http://www.netamericas.net/Researchpapers/Documents/Joslin/joslin2.pdf.
7. SeeJosling, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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upon developing countries to adopt favorable regulatory ap-
proaches. In particular, these pressures are applied through the
instruments of technical assistance-often in the context of the
WTO's special and differential treatment ("SDT") regime-and
food aid.' On the one hand, technical assistance is provided on
the condition that the recipients adopt regulatory policies that
are favorable to the benefactors.9 On the other hand, food aid
serves as an instrument to capture new markets for GM food
products."0 These bilateral pressures therefore serve to under-
mine the policy autonomy of developing countries to regulate
trade in GM food products in the interests of their citizens. Fur-
ther, they serve to narrow regulatory conversations by advocating
for an approach that largely excludes the citizens of developing
countries from participation in the administrative frameworks
for regulation.
This Article reviews the experience of developing countries
with the regulation of trade in GM food products in light of such
bilateral pressures and argues that there is a need for broader
public participation in the regulation of biotechnology as this
will facilitate national governance in an era in which the interna-
tional trade regime is rapidly eroding national regulatory deci-
sion-making autonomy." Furthermore, broadening public par-
ticipation promises to rescue governments of developing coun-
tries from the aforementioned bilateral pressures by helping to
strengthen their hands in negotiations for technical assistance
and food aid.12 That is, developing country governments can
use participatory regulatory frameworks as a negotiation tool by
showing either that their policies are "rooted in ... public sup-
port" or that there would be a lack of support for-or even op-
8. See Ruth Mackenzie, Globalisation and the International Governance of Biotechnology:
The International Regulation of Modern Biotechnology, at 18-19 (2004), Paper presented at
the Globalisation and Poverty Res. Programme of the U. of Sussex Inst. of Dev. Studies,
available at http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/RMregulationfinal.pdf.
9. Jane Bloom Stewart & Ernestine Meijer, Regulation of GMO Crops and Foods: A
Final Synthesis of Country Studies 40 (Oct. 31, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with New York University Law Sch. Ctr. on Envtl & Land Use Law).
10. Oxfam, Food Aid or Hidden Dumping? Separating Wheat from Chaff 22 (Oxfam
Briefing Paper No. 71, 2005) [hereinafter Food Aid or Hidden Dumping?], available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues/trade/downloads/bp7lfood-aid.pdf.
11. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZA-
TION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004).
12. See Dominic Glover, Public Participation in National Biotechnology Policy and Bi-
osafety Regulation (Univ. of Sussex Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 198, 2003).
2006]
268 FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:265
position to-any unsuitable regulatory reforms they are being
urged to implement.13
Part I provides the Article's conceptual framework and ex-
amines the impact of the WTO's special and differential regime
on developing countries' regulatory policy autonomy. Part I also
argues that as far as the regulation of trade in GM foods is con-
cerned, the SDT regime undermines these countries' policy au-
tonomy because it facilitates the application of bilateral pres-
sures, and thereby compromises the establishment of democratic
regulatory policies supportive of local priorities. Part II exam-
ines how international regulatory uncertainty has led to the ap-
plication of bilateral pressures on developing countries to adopt
narrow frameworks for the regulation of trade in GM food prod-
ucts. Part III examines the role of science in biotechnology reg-
ulation and argues that broadening public participation will fa-
cilitate the adoption of regulatory measures that are responsive
to local needs and concerns.
I. THE IMPACT OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT ON POLICY AUTONOMY
A. The Idea of Special and Differential Treatment
"SDT" refers to "a category of measures through which de-
veloped countries respond to the particular risks and vulnerabili-
ties that developing countries face in international trade.' 1 4 It
denotes the idea that international trade should not only be fair
but also take into account the developmental needs of develop-
ing countries. The WTO's SDT regime institutionalizes the pro-
vision of aid, or development assistance, to developing countries
in the international trade arena. 5
In programmatic terms, this aid regime has three basic ele-
ments: preferential market access, market protection, and tech-
nical assistance.' 6 Preferential market access programs are based
13. Id.
14. FrankJ. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 291, 291-92 (2004). There are about one hundred and forty provisions that
apply special and differential treatment ("SDT") within the current General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and World Trade Organization ("'IATO") system. See
Peter Lichtenbaum, "Special Treatment" vs. "Equal Participation:" Striking a Balance in the
Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1003, 1010 (2002).
15. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 292.
16. See id.
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on the idea that developed countries can support the economic
development of developing countries, and allows the latter to
export their products into the markets of the former at preferen-
tial rates. They are essentially handled through the generalized
system of preferences ("GSP")." 7 Market protection programs
are based on the idea of nonreciprocity and encompass mea-
sures by developing countries to protect their economies from
the adverse impact of competition from the technologically ad-
vanced developed countries." Market protection programs in-
clude domestic measures to protect "infant industries" in devel-
oping countries. 9 For its part, technical assistance entails the
provision of aid in various forms to developing countries, and is
premised on the idea that "states rich in [trade-related] knowl-
edge, and the resources to pay for it, should share that knowl-
edge and financially support its implementation."2
B. Special and Differential Treatment in Practice
In practice, the promise of SDT has not been realized suffi-
ciently.2 Developed countries have either failed to live up to
their commitments or attached conditionalities to their SDT
programs, thereby negating any potential benefits thereof.2 2
Further, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
and WTO's SDT provisions have no force of law, and there are,
therefore, no sanctions where they are breached by developed
17. See GATT Contracting Parties, Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treat-
ment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1980) (authorizing the generalized system of prefer-
ences ("GSP"), which permits developed countries to accord preferential treatment to
products from developing countries.).
18. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 292 (observing that the principle of nonreciprocity
recognizes that developed countries should not expect equivalent access or concessions
in return).
19. See id. at 294.
20. Id.
21. It should be noted that some of the causes of the relative failure of SDT pro-
grams are to be found within the developing countries themselves. For instance, it is
argued that market protection programs in these countries "distort domestic resource
allocation and encourage rent seeking and waste." Lichtenbaum, supra note 14, at 1016.
22. See Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing
World, 21 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 975, 1036-39 (2000) (discussing the effect of conditionalities
on U.S. market access measures); see also Garcia, supra note 14, at 298 (discussing the
failure of developed nations to remove domestic barriers to trade in industries critical
to developing nations); Lichtenbaum, supra note 14, at 1014-16 (discussing the effect of
U.S. conditionalities on market access measures.).
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countries.23 In particular, SDT programs have adversely affected
the policy autonomy of developing countries in two significant
respects, given that the admission of developing countries into
the World Food Program ("PMA") is typically conditioned upon
compliance "with a host of non-trade-related requirements,"24
while technical assistance programs primarily seek to promote
the interests of the donor countries. For example, the United
States' African Growth and Opportunity Act ("AGOA") provides
a good illustration of the use of conditionalities in PMA pro-
grams. It provides that import tariff concessions will only be
granted under the United States' GSP scheme to Sub-Saharan
African countries that meet certain eligibility criteria, including
the establishment of a market-based economy, the rule of law,
and political pluralism. 25 On the other hand, export market de-
velopment is at least an implicit goal of many technical assis-
tance programs.26 As we will see, program conditionalities and
the export market development goal have both undermined the
policy autonomy of developing countries in the context of the
regulation of GM food products.
While the WTO's SDT regime clearly needs rethinking, the
proposals mooted so far largely remain within the conceptual
confines of the existing paradigm. Thus, the WTO's 2001 Doha
Ministerial Declaration calls for a review of SDT provisions "with
a view to strengthening them and making them more precise,
effective, and operational. ' 27 The hope is that developed coun-
tries will be more committed to the realization of SDT. But such
hope may be misplaced, considering that the developed coun-
23. See Gustavo Olivares, The Case for Giving Effectiveness to GATTI/WTO Rules on De-
veloping Countries and LDCs, 35J. OF WORLD TRAE 545, 547-48 (2001).
24. Garcia, supra note 14, at 303.
25. See African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA], Pub. L. No. 106-200, Title I,
§ 104(a) (1) (B), 114 Stat. 251, 254 (2000); see alsoJ.M. Migai Akech, The African Growth
and Opportunity Act: Implications for Kenya's Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. &
POL. 651 (2001) (analyzing the limitations of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
[AGOA]).
26. See, e.g., Christopher B. Barrett, Food Aid and Commercial International Food Trade
6 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Trade and Markets Div. Background
Paper, Mar. 2002), available at http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty__sites/cbb2/Papers/Bar-
rettOECDReportMar2002.pdf ("It is plain that the trade promotion objective of food
aid persists.").
27. World Trade Organization [WTO], Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, 44, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial
Declaration].
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tries' lack of political commitment to SDT has been the major
problem in the first place. Indeed, the non-binding character of
the SDT regime gives the developed countries discretion, which
facilitates their deployment of bilateral pressures to realize their
national interests. 28 Because SDT programs are unilateral, the
developed countries offering them are free to attach condition-
alities and ensure that such programs further their national
goals. This explains why developed countries have greatly re-
sisted attempts to transform the existing moral SDT obligations
into legal ones. In view of the prevailing international power
dynamics, it is thus unlikely that a "more precise, effective and
operational ' 29 SDT regime will be realized. It is for this reason
that developing countries should involve their citizens in the reg-
ulatory process if they are to realize their interests, especially in
contexts-such as GM food regulation-where there is interna-
tional regulatory uncertainty.
Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the SDT regime
should therefore be seen in the broader context of the need for
the reform of international aid.3° By and large, the international
aid regime does not serve the interests of the developing country
recipients due to a host of domestic and international factors. In
particular, the donor countries have "captured" the govern-
ments of the recipient developing countries, with the result that
aid initiatives largely serve the geopolitical and economic inter-
ests of the donors and the narrow interests of these govern-
ments."1 Since this capture is facilitated by the lack of effective
democracy (that is, participation in and accountability of govern-
28. See Garcia, supra note 14, at 298; see also Lichtenbaum, supra note 14, at 1014-
16.
29. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 27; see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersman,
Introduction to Mini-Symposium on Developing Country in the Doha Round, 8J. INT'L ECON. L.
34, 351-52 (2005) (observing that the "Doha Round proposals for rendering S&D [spe-
cial and differential] provisions 'more precise, effective and operational' are perceived
as unlikely to enhance development in [less-developed countries] efficiently.").
30. See J. M. Migai Akech, Development Partners and Governance of Public Procurement
in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the Administration of Aid, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
(forthcoming 2006).
31. See Barrett, supra note 26, at 6; see also Jongeun Lee, Note, Study of the Interna-
tional Food Security Regime: Food Aid to North Korea During the Famine of 1995-2000, 11
CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 1037, 1060 (2004) (citing Edward Clay & Olav Stokke, The
Changing Role of Food Aid and Finance For Food, in FoOD AID AND HUMAN SECURITY 13, 15
(Edward Clay & Olav Stokke eds., 2000)) ("To some extent, aid has always been used as
an instrument for promoting the national interests of the donor country.").
2006]
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mental decision-making processes) in these countries, efforts to
ensure that international regulation responds to the needs and
concerns of the citizens of these developing countries must
therefore include the democratization of national governance
frameworks.
In the context of trade in GM foods, as we will see, the SDT
regime has facilitated the application of bilateral political and
economic pressures, resulting in policies that do not take into
account the needs and concerns of the citizens of developing
countries. While such policies may have significant adverse ef-
fects on these citizens, they are made "beyond the reach of do-
mestic political structures" due to the capture of developing
country governments by the donor countries. 2 Nevertheless,
this democracy deficit can be overcome by establishing meaning-
ful institutional frameworks for public participation in biotech-
nology regulation.
II. THE REGULATION OF TRADE IN GM FOOD PRODUCTS:
INTERNATIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. The United States/Eurapean Union GM Foods Dispute
There has been a rapid adoption of GM crops in the world's
principal agricultural exporting countries, namely the United
States, Argentina, and Canada, over the last decade.33 It has
been estimated that "[i]n 2000, of the 43.1 million hectares [of
GM crops] planted world wide, [98%] was planted in these three
countries, with [68%] of the global total planted in the USA,
[23%] in Argentina, and [7%] in Canada. '3 4 In the United
States, "biotech crops accounted for 80% of soybean, 38% of
maize, and 70% of corn production" in 2003."5 These countries
have therefore sought market access for their GM food products
as they seek to maximize their comparative advantage.
Unfortunately for them, many other members of the WTO
have largely sought to exclude GM food products, as they are
32. A AN, supra note 11 at 3.
33. See Sheldon, supra note 6, at 155.
34. Id.
35. Starla L. Borg, Note, Waiting for the River: The United States and the European
Union, Heads Up and High Stakes in the WTO-Genetically Modified Organisms in Interna-
tional Trade, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 681, 698 (2004).
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concerned about the long-term risks associated with genetically
modified organisms ("GMOs").36 The principal culprits here
are the EU, which has adopted regulations prohibiting the re-
lease of GMOs into the environment and the commercialization
of GM foods "until there is extensive evidence that they will not
cause harm to humans, animals and the environment. ' 37  The
EU has further adopted regulations for the mandatory labeling
of GM foods in response to consumer concerns. 38  It also im-
posed a moratorium in 1998 on the approval of new agricultural
biotechnology products.3 9 As a result of these restrictive poli-
cies, the United States, which is the EU's principal trading part-
ner, has suffered huge economic losses as a considerable portion
of its agricultural products has been excluded from European
markets.40 In the estimation of the United States, these mea-
sures amount to protectionism and thus violate international
trade rules.41 Along with Canada and Argentina, the United
States has therefore requested a dispute settlement panel under
the WTO to challenge the EU's moratorium.4"
The crux of the U.S./EU trade dispute is a conflict between
36. See Sheldon, supra note 6, at 160. The concerns over possible adverse impacts
of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") include: (i) potential impacts on non-
target species, such as beneficial insects; (ii) the potential spread of GM crops as weeds;
(iii) potential for cross-pollination between genetically modified ("GM") crops and
non-GM crops and wild plants (also known as "genetic pollution"); (iv) potential im-
pacts on soil bacteria and the nitrogen cycle; (v) indirect effects on the environment,
including changed agricultural practices; and (vi) potential impacts on human health.
See Barbara Eggers & Ruth Mackenzie, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 525, 526 (2000).
37. Sheldon, supra note 6, at 160.
38. See id.
39. See Borg, supra note 35, at 685.
40. See Marc Victor, Precaution or Protectionism? The Precautionary Principle, Genetically
Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fears to Undermine Free Trade, 14 TRANSNAT'L
L. 295, 296 (2001).
41. See President George W. Bush, Commencement Address Before the U.S. Coast
Guard Academy (May 21, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2003/05/20030521-2.html (characterizing European regulation of GM foods as
based on "unfounded, unscientific fears"); see also Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, United States Requests Dispute Panel in WTO Challenge to EU
Biotech Moratorium (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document
Library/Press Releases/2003/August/SectionIndex.html; David Leonhardt, Talks Col-
lapse on U.S. Efforts To Open Europe to Biotech Food, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at Al ("The
Bush administration and agricultural businesses view the policy as simple protectionism
because U.S. companies, which dominate the biotechnology industry, would benefit
most from lifting the ban.").
42. See Borg, supra note 35, at 683.
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the goals of free trade in GM products and the protection of
human health and the environment in a context in which there
is considerable scientific uncertainty surrounding biotechnol-
ogy, which "has hindered the ability to accurately predict poten-
tial harms."43 This conflict is magnified by a growing public dis-
trust for governmental regulation, as GM crops harmful to
human health have in some cases erroneously found their way
into the food chain.4 4 Further, it does not help the situation that
the WTO agreements do not specifically address agricultural bio-
technology, thereby creating international uncertainty with re-
spect to the regulation of trade in GM food products.4 5 Indeed,
it has been suggested that the members of the WTO will have to
develop new agreements to deal with matters such as consumer
and ethical concerns.46
While the United States adopts a product-oriented ap-
proach to the regulation of GM foods that is driven by a desire to
facilitate free trade, the EU adopts a process-oriented approach
that is largely driven by the need for precaution.47 The U.S. ap-
proach is guided by the principle that there should be minimal
oversight of food products that are "generally regarded as safe"
("GRAS") ." Conventional food products are considered GRAS,
and GM foods should therefore be judged by the same standards
since "they do not differ in any substantial way from those devel-
oped through traditional plant breeding methods."49 The ratio-
nale is that "zero tolerance for potentially hazardous ingredients
in food would result in few foods ever being marketed. '5 0 The
objective of regulation-under the U.S. approach-should
43. Michelle K. McDonald, International Trade Law and the US.-EU GMO Debate:
Can Africa Weather This Storm?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 501, 504 (2004).
44. In the United States, for example, Starlink corn, a GM corn manufactured by
Aventis CropScience but not approved for human consumption, was discovered to have
mixed with other corn used by Kraft and other large manufacturers in food production.
See Aaron A. Ostrovsky, The European Commission's Regulations for Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms and the Current WTO Dispute-Human Health or Environmental Measures? Why the
Deliberate Release Directive is More Appropriately Adjudicated in the WTO Under the TBT Agree-
ment, 15 COLO. J. INrr'L EN'vr'L L. & POL'Y 209, 214-15 (2004).
45. See Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 535.
46. See Sheldon, supra note 6, at 168.
47. See Nathan W. Eckley, Note, Reaping the Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology
through Uniform Regulation, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 433, 436-37 (2002).
48. Sheldon, supra note 6, at 157.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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therefore "not be to establish absolute safety, but to consider
whether a GM food (ingredient) is as safe as its conventional
counterpart. 51
Conversely, the EU's precautionary approach is premised
on a belief that science is uncertain about the long-run risks as-
sociated with GMOs.5 1 Thus, even where scientific risk assess-
ments have been carried out on GMOs, they should not be re-
leased into the environment or commercialized "until there is
extensive evidence that they will not cause harm to humans, ani-
mals and the environment. '53 Accordingly, "pro-active measures
must be taken to reduce the risk of uncertain scientific dangers
in GMOs. ' 54 In the EU's view, the precautionary approach is
particularly suitable because it enables regulatory authorities to
take consumers' concerns into account.55 To a considerable ex-
tent, the EU's approach is a response to consumer backlashes
against genetically altered foods in the wake of debacles such as
the outbreak of mad-cow disease.5 6 Unlike the United States,
which encourages self-regulation among GM-producing firms,
the EU has adopted a regulatory model, which requires prior
governmental approval before GMOs can be released into the
environment.57
Over the last decade or so, while the United States (to-
gether with Japan and Canada, who have also adopted the prod-
uct approach) has approved some one hundred GMOs for re-
lease into the environment, the EU has only approved fourteen
GMOs. 5' The EU's arduous approval process is thus being
51. Id.
52. See id. at 160.
53. Id.
54. Eckley, supra note 47, at 443. The precautionary principle is enshrined in Arti-
cle 174 of the EC Treaty. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community art. 174, O.J. C. 325/33 (2002), at 107-08.
55. See Victor, supra note 40, at 320 ("[W]hat drives consumers' concerns is a dis-
trust of the motives of their regulatory authorities, the honesty of their politicians, and
the objectivity of their scientists rather than fear of any genuine danger created by
CMOs.").
56. See, e.g., Cow Crunching: BSE/New Evidence on Mad Cows, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 31,
1996, at 49.
57. See Council Directive No. 90/220, O.J. L 117/8/5 (1990); see also Commission
Regulation No. 258/97, O.J. L 043 (1997) (also known as the "Novel Foods Regula-
tion").
58. See Eckley, supra note 47, at 443.
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blamed for impeding trade in GM foods.5" By contrast, the U.S.
approach is being extolled since its liberal GMO approval pro-
cess "leads to increased profits for corporations, and, in turn,
funds future research and development projects for GMO prod-
ucts."6 ° Nevertheless, while a liberal GMO approval process may
be conducive to free trade, it may not be suitable for the protec-
tion of human health and the environment. It has thus been
noted that the problem with the United States' laissez-faire regu-
latory system is that "even when a company does not meet its
food safety responsibilities, the [regulator] only takes action af-
ter some harm has resulted."6 '
Since the trade policies of the United States and the EU
have a significant impact upon developing countries, the latter
now find themselves at a loss as to how to regulate GM food
products given these diametric approaches.6 2 Agricultural prod-
ucts constitute developing countries' principal exports to Eu-
rope and the United States.6" Depending on the regulatory ap-
proach they adopt to GM food products, their trade with Euro-
pean countries and the United States could be affected
adversely. At the same time, these countries often have trouble
feeding their citizens and from time to time do receive food aid,
especially from the United States.6 4 Furthermore, developing
countries have been the recipients of development assistance
from the United States and the EU to enable them to establish
policies and laws for the regulation of GMOs.65 Such assistance,
however, invariably comes with strings attached, and the expec-
tation tends to be that the recipients will adopt regulatory poli-
59. See id. at 443, 447.
60. Id. at 444.
61. Victor, supra note 40, at 305.
62. See, e.g., Robert L. Paarlberg, Governing the GM Crop Revolution: Policy Choices for
Developing Countries 2 (Int'l Food Pol'y Res. Inst. ("IFPRI"), Food, Agriculture, and the
Environment Discussion Paper 33, 2000) ("[D]ivergent policies toward GM technolo-
gies in rich countries have now created a complicated problem of policy choice in the
developing world .... Should governments in the developing world follow the more
permissive U.S. approach toward GM crop technologies or the more precautionary EU
approach?").
63. See, e.g., Paul Breton & Takako Ikezuki, The Impact of Agricultural Trade Prefer-
ences, with Particular Attention to the Least-Developed Countries, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL
TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 68, 69 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, eds.,
2003).
64. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 26, at 7.
65. See Paarlberg, supra note 62, at 31.
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cies and laws favorable to the donors.6 6
Developing countries are therefore at a crossroads: Should
they adopt a permissive or restrictive approach to trade in GM
foods? Should they accept or decline GM food aid? Should they
accept or decline development assistance in their efforts to es-
tablish suitable regulatory policies and laws on GMOs? These
dilemmas are enhanced by the uncertainty over the regulation
of GM foods within the framework of the world trade regime. As
we will see, this regulatory uncertainty has led the developed
countries, especially the United States and the EU, to apply bilat-
eral pressures on developing countries to adopt their respective
approaches.
B. The International Regulatory Framework for Trade in GM Foods
As a general rule, the GATT/WTO mandates non-discrimi-
nation, that is, equal treatment of like products between all con-
tracting parties.67 Further, it requires national treatment, that is,
equal internal treatment of both imported and domestic prod-
ucts.6" Nevertheless, Article XX of the GATT permits measures
intended to protect human health and the environment, pro-
vided that "such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade."6 Thus, restrictive
trade measures enacted to protect human health and the envi-
ronment will be held to violate the GATT if their effect is the
differential application of a measure to domestic and foreign
products.7 " Historically, it has been difficult for measures to
meet the stringent requirements of Article XX since "GATT
panels have narrowly construed the language in Article XX in
favor of trade and against non-tariff barriers to trade."'" Typi-
cally, the GATT panels overruled such measures on the ground
that they were discriminatory and that less discriminatory mea-
66. See, e.g., Stewart & Meijer, supra note 9.
67. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
68. See id. art. III.
69. Id. art. XX.
70. See McDonald, supra note 43, at 515.
71. Id. at 514.
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sures were available.72 In addition, Article XX measures are only
available against products and cannot be directed at process or
production methods.73
At the Uruguay Round, it was felt that Article XX had some
"gray areas" that needed to be resolved.7 ' For example, Article
XX did not establish any criteria for determining whether mea-
sures were necessary and provided no specific procedure for set-
fling disputes on such matters.75 The Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") and the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") were
the result of this review process. The SPS Agreement sought to
elaborate on the health and safety exception contained in Arti-
cle XX(b) of GATT.7 6 In particular, it elaborates on the general
procedural requirements to be followed by contracting parties
seeking protection of human, animal, or plant life or health.77
The TBT Agreement builds upon the Tokyo Round Standards
Code and establishes guidelines by which contracting parties
could implement legitimate product standards. 78  The TBT
Agreement applies mainly to voluntary and mandatory labeling
requirements that are not covered by the SPS Agreement.79
Conversely, the SPS Agreement applies to food safety measures,
including labeling requirements, and is accordingly thought to
be more relevant to resolving the GM foods conflict.8s It also
should be noted that these agreements apply concurrently with
the GATT.8 t
72. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J. 421, 459
(1998).
73. See Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 1 37,
GATT B.I.S.D. DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (not adopted).
74. See McDonald, supra note 43, at 517.
75. SeeJosling, supra note 6, at 3.
76. See George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New
Legal Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 457 (2001).
77. See, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, Annex 1A, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agree-
ment].
78. See Kennedy, supra note 72, at 460.
79. See Arthur E. Appleton, The Labeling of GMO Products Pursuant to International
Trade Rules, 8 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L. J.. 566, 574 (2000).
80. See McDonald, supra note 43, at 519.
81. See Ostrovsky, supra note 44, at 241 (observing that "even if a measure is found
to be lawful under the TBT Agreement, it may still violate the GATT," because the
former agreement imposes obligations that are different from and additional to the
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The principal purpose of the SPS Agreement is to prevent
restrictions on international trade disguised as health and safety
measures.8 2 The SPS Agreement does not create specific stan-
dards, but simply provides general rules for WTO members to
follow when establishing sanitary and phytosanitary ("SPS") mea-
sures.83 In particular, it requires members to base their SPS
measures on science and not to use them as disguised barriers to
trade.8 4 The SPS Agreement presumes that "measures which
conform to .. . international standards, guidelines or recom-
mendations [are] necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health." 5 But where a member proposes to impose mea-
sures stricter than those established by international standards, it
can only do so if it provides sufficient scientific justification for
its proposed measures.8 6 In the latter scenario, the member is
required to undertake a scientific "risk assessment" to evaluate
the likelihood of adverse consequences.8 7 The risk assessment
must be based on an examination and evaluation of available
scientific information, and will only justify the imposition of an
SPS measure if a "rational relationship" exists between the risk
assessment and the measure.8 8 Further, an SPS measure that
passes this science test must not be more trade restrictive than
necessary, must be consistent with comparable regulations, and
must be taken without undue delay. 9 The SPS Agreement also
requires members to maintain transparent SPS regulations, and
prohibits the use of control, inspection, and approval proce-
dures as unjustified barriers to imports.9 °
While the SPS Agreement makes no specific reference to
the precautionary principle, it nevertheless provides that "a
Member may provisionally adopt... [SPS] measures on the basis
of available pertinent information" in cases where relevant scien-
GATT7); see also Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 536 (observing that a measure
prohibiting "the use of GM seed stocks because of socio-economic considerations,
would still be covered by Articles III, XI and XX of the GATT 1994.").
82. See McDonald, supra note 43, at 507.
83. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 77.
84. See id. arts. 2.2-2.3.
85. Id. art. 3.2.
86. See id. art. 3.3.
87. See Victor, supra note 40, at 307.
88. Id. at 308.
89. See Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 538.
90. See SPS Agreement, supra note 77, arts. 7, 8.
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tific evidence is insufficient.91 But in such cases, the member is
mandated "to obtain the additional information necessary for a
more objective assessment of risk and review the .. .[SPS] mea-
sure accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 9 2 The
WTO's Appellate Body has determined that a "reasonable pe-
riod of time" must be established on a "case-by-case basis. 93
On the other hand, the TBT Agreement covers standards
and "technical regulations that focus on non-safety related attrib-
utes of all products, such as the characteristics of how a product
was produced."94 Unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agree-
ment does not require scientific justification for any standards or
technical regulations, as its scope "extends beyond measures that
could justify risk on scientific assessment (such as professional
licensing regimes)."95 The TBT Agreement provides that stan-
dards or technical regulations may only restrict trade to the ex-
tent and duration necessary to achieve a "legitimate" regulatory
objective. 96 It provides a non-exhaustive list of legitimate objec-
tives, which has been held to include protection of consumers,
markets transparency, and fair competition.97
Further, the TBT Agreement requires members imposing
standards or technical regulations to take into account the risks
of not achieving the legitimate regulatory objective.98 In assess-
ing such risks, a member is required to consider "available scien-
tific and technical information, related processing technology,
or intended end-uses of products." 9 This list of risk elements is
not exhaustive. The TBT Agreement's risk assessment require-
ments therefore seem to be broader and "much less rigorous"
than those of the SPS Agreement.100 Thus "regulators would
91. Id. art. 5.7.
92. Id.
93. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, 14,
84, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).
94. Sheldon, supra note 6, at 167.
95. Ostrovsky, supra note 44, at 221.
96. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Goods, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
97. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
263, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002).
98. See TBT Agreement, supra note 96, art. 2.2.
99. Id.
100. Nick Covelli & Viktor Hohots, The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods Under the
WTO Agreements, 6J. INT'L ECON. L. 773, 787 (2003).
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find it easier to justify a GM food-related measure under the
TBT Agreement than under the SPS Agreement."' '
Some commentators argue that "disputes regarding GMOs
and GMO regulations are better handled by the more general
[TBT Agreement]" since the scope of the SPS Agreement "may
prove to be too narrow to encompass the concerns that sur-
round GMOs." t ° 2 Further, they argue that the SPS Agreement is
not designed to protect against the kind of risks that GMOs pre-
sent.10 3 That is, the SPS Agreement only applies to sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, which are "only a subset of the total
risks associated with GMOs."1 °4 Because "GMOs present risks
that go beyond risks to the sanitary and phytosanitary, it is not
clear that the SPS Agreement is designed to regulate measures
which seek to protect against risks associated with GMOs in
toto."10
5
At the same time, however, the TBT Agreement provides
that it does not apply to SPS measures "as defined in Annex A of
the [SPS Agreement]."1°6 In view of the jurisdictional questions
raised by this provision, a question arises as to how a member is
to regulate trade in GM foods if it proposes to address the risks
presented by GMOs comprehensively. Should such a member
be allowed tojustify the non-SPS aspects of its regulations on the
basis of the less stringent requirements of the TBT Agreement?
Much will depend on whether WTO Panels and the Appellate
Body would be agreeable to such an accommodating interpreta-
tion of the SPS and TBT Agreements.
Another international instrument that seeks to regulate
trade in GMOs is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
("CPB").107 While the CPB is an international environmental
101. Id.
102. Ostrovsky, supra note 44, at 210-11 (suggesting that "trade regulations de-
signed to protect the environment, so long as their scope is greater than simply the
protection of human health, should be considered under the less restrictive demands
of the TBT Agreement. This is significant because the TBT Agreement, in not requir-
ing scientific evidence, presents a lower threshold for compliance than the SPS Agree-
ment."). See, e.g., Kara-Anne Yaren, Trade and Genetically Modified Foods: Frankenfears-A
Callfor Consistency, 1 AsPER REv. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 149 (2001).
103. See Ostrovsky, supra note 44, at 221.
104. Id. at 222.
105. Id. at 222-23.
106. TBT Agreement, supra note 96, art. 1.5.
107. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ("CPB") was adopted in Montreal on
January 29, 2000 and entered into force on September 11, 2003. The CPB was adopted
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agreement, it addresses the international movement of "living
modified organisms" ("LMOs") and therefore impacts trade.'08
The main provision of the CPB is its Advance Informed Agree-
ment ("AIA") mechanism, which requires exporters to obtain
the consent of the country of import before shipping LMOs to
that country for the first time. °9 A party seeking to export an
LMO destined for "intentional introduction into the environ-
ment" must notify the potential recipient country of its intention
through the AIA procedure. 1 ' The potential importing country
must then decide whether to permit the importation of the
LMO. The CPB mandates the potential importing country to
base its decision upon risk assessments carried out in a "scientifi-
cally sound manner."'11 Alternatively, the potential importing
country may require the exporter to conduct the risk assess-
ment.
1 1 2
The AIA procedure does not, however, apply to LMOs in-
tended for direct use for food, feed, or for processing (the so-
called LMO-FFPs). In practice, this means, for instance, that
while "the export of GM maize seeds for field trials needs to be
notified to and approved by the party of import in advance ....
an exporter who wishes to ship a consignment of GM seeds for
use as animal feed in a swine farm would not need to obey the
strict notification requirements established by the AIA.""' 3 In-
stead, the CPB provides for a different procedure for the regula-
tion of LMO-FFPs, under which a country intending to export
under the auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity and is the first binding
international agreement dealing with modem biotechnology. See SECRETARIAT OF THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFErY TO THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: TEXTS AND ANNEXES (2000), http://www.biodiv.
org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf [hereinafter CPB]; see also Eggers & Macken-
zie, supra note 36, at 527.
108. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the Environ-
ment: The Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of the
World Trade Organization, 14 COLO.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2003). The CPB defines a
"living modified organism" ("LMO") as "any living organism that possesses a novel com-
bination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology." CPB,
supra note 107, art. 3(g). In using the term "living organism" the CPB "appears implic-
itly to exclude non-living products of LMOs, for example, processed tomato puree as
opposed to fresh tomatoes." Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 529.
109. See CPB, supra note 107, arts. 7-10, 12.
110. Id. arts. 7(1), 8.
111. Id. art. 15(1).
112. See id. art. 15(2).
113. Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 530.
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LMO-FFPs is merely required to inform the potential recipient
country of its decision through a "Biosafety Clearing-House."
'
"
14
In effect, the CPB leaves the regulation of LMO-FFPs to the dis-
cretion of the importing and exporting parties."1 5
While the CPB allows parties to take precautionary mea-
sures, it limits this right by requiring the party of import to re-
view its precautionary measures in light of new scientific evi-
dence if an exporting country requests it. 16 But precautionary
measures under the CPB need not be provisional: "Parties do
not have an ongoing obligation to keep [measures] under re-
view unless explicitly requested to do so by the exporter." 17 Fur-
ther, the CPB allows parties to take socio-economic considera-
tions "arising from the impact of [LMOs] on the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity" into account in their
decision-making on LMO imports." 8 But in doing so they are
required to act consistently with their international obliga-
tions.' 19
From these provisions of the CPB, it is unclear whether it
applies to disputes involving food safety. The CPB provides that
it applies to LMOs that may adversely affect the environment,
"taking also into account risks to human health."' 2 ° And as
pointed out in the preceding paragraph, it only allows the con-
sideration of socio-economic concerns in the context of bi-
odiversity conservation and not human health. While "a dam-
aged environment could adversely affect humans," the EU and
the United States have, for example, taken different views on this
matter.' 2' The United States contends that the Protocol does
not apply to food safety, while the EU maintains that it does. 1 2 2
In addition, and as we have seen, the CPB leaves the regulation
of LMO-FFPs to the parties, thereby excluding most of the GM
products that are currently traded from its purview. 12 3 It would
114. CPB, supra note 107, art. 11(1).
115. See Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 531.
116. See CPB, supra note 107, arts. 10(6), 11(8), 12(2)-(3).
117. Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 540.
118. See CPB, supra note 107, art. 26.
119. Id.
120. Id. art. 4.
121. See Stewart &Johanson, supra note 108, at 8.
122. See id. at 8-9.
123. LMO-FFPs currently make up ninety percent of trade in GM products. See
Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 530.
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therefore seem that the CPB, which is a "complex and highly
negotiated instrument" reflecting "a delicate balance between
the competing interests at stake, 1 24 sought to steer clear of the
domain of the WTO. In these circumstances, it should come as
no surprise that "the final language of how the Protocol will re-
late to other international agreements . . . was not fully re-
solved." 125 The CPB does not therefore affect the rights and ob-
ligations of the parties under the rules of the WTO. 1 2 6
From the foregoing account, it is evident that the existing
international framework for the regulation of trade in GM prod-
ucts does not establish clear rules. The framework reflects great
compromises between countries favoring free trade in these
products on the one hand, and those favoring precaution on the
other hand. That is, countries on the opposite ends of this di-
vide have opposed the promulgation of clear international rules
in order to preserve their freedom to determine the levels of
regulation that they deem appropriate according to national
needs and concerns.
Because the international rules are not clear, much de-
pends on how they are interpreted. The language of the above
complex international agreements is ambiguous, and the mean-
ing and scope of concepts such as "risk assessment" and "suffi-
cient scientific evidence" are not clearly established.1 27 Thus,
whether or not these agreements will facilitate a resolution of
the "free trade versus precaution" conflict will depend on how
the WTO panels and the Appellate Body interpret the meaning
and scope of such concepts. For example, how should govern-
ments regulate trade in GM products in cases where scientific
evidence is either divided or uncertain? In the Hormones Case,
the WTO's Appellate Body thought that an SPS measure could
still be based on a risk assessment even if scientific opinion were
divided or uncertain, reasoning that "responsible and represen-
tative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at
a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified
and respected sources. ' 128 The Appellate Body thus advocates a
124. Id. at 527.
125. Stewart &Johanson, supra note 108, at 23.
126. See id.
127. See Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 537.
128. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones) 194, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS/48/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998).
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case-to-case approach in determining whether a measure is
based on risk assessment; this does not, however, provide clear
guidance as to how governments are to apply risk assessment in
the regulation of trade in GM products. Furthermore, govern-
ments in developing countries are often not "responsible and
representative," 129 and it is thus plausible that they may allow
free trade in GM products on the basis of suspect risk assess-
ments.
In addition, the requirement of the SPS Agreement that a
measure be "scientifically based" has been interpreted differ-
ently. 3 ° According to the United States, for example, this re-
quirement recognizes that "scientific certainty is rare and many
scientific determinations require judgments between differing
scientific views" and "preserves the ability of governments to
make such judgments."' 3 ' This interpretation of the SPS Agree-
ment reflects the United States' desire to preserve its freedom to
make judgments on science according to national needs and
concerns.
In view of the uncertainty of the above international agree-
ments, it is also unclear whether, for instance, the EU's restric-
tive regime violates international trade rules. In the context of
its dispute with the United States, the EU would for instance ar-
gue that its regime aims to implement a scientific-based risk as-
sessment as required by the international agreements. Con-
versely, the United States would argue that if the GM and con-
ventional food products are essentially equivalent, then the EU
regulations would violate GATT Article III, as they would be giv-
ing the former products less favorable treatment.'3 2 Thus, bas-
ing the regulation of GM food products on the process of ge-
netic modification would constitute a trade barrier if the GM
products can objectively be determined to be as safe as their con-
ventional counterparts.133 The resolution of the dispute will
therefore depend on how the safety determination is to be
made. And since there are no agreed objective criteria for the
129. Id.
130. See Julie Teel, Note, Regulating Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An
Overview of Approaches, 8 N.Y.U. ENvWL. L. J. 649, 691 (2000).
131. John H. Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural
Trade, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVr'L L. REv. 95, 102 (1996).
132. See Sheldon, supra note 6, at 167.
133. See id.
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determination of safety, it will be difficult to argue that the EU's
regime violates the international rules.
For this reason, it has been suggested that perhaps the best
solution to the EU/U.S. dispute would be for the EU to allow
greater market access to U.S. exports that meet its stringent reg-
ulations and standards. 34 This suggestion is based on the idea
that while the WTO primarily seeks to achieve and maintain ne-
gotiated levels of market access, it should equally ensure flexibil-
ity in terms of domestic regulation. 135 In other words, the WTO
should allow its member countries to establish their own regula-
tions and standards that reflect domestic risk valuations and
then only mandate the maintenance of negotiated levels of mar-
ket access.
As far as developing countries are concerned, however, in-
ternational regulatory uncertainty has led to the application of
bilateral political and economic pressures in the context of SDT
programs, whose object has been for these countries to adopt
regulatory frameworks that promote the interests of the donor
countries.136 This phenomenon can be observed in the provi-
sion of technical assistance to assist developing countries estab-
lish biotechnology regulatory frameworks and the administra-
tion of food aid.
C. The Impact of Regulatory Uncertainty on Developing Countries
The impact of regulatory uncertainty on developing coun-
tries should be assessed in the context of their unique concerns
regarding trade in GM food products. These unique concerns
include food security, poverty, the likely adverse impact of GM
food imports on the competitiveness and livelihoods of farmers,
different food consumption patterns that are dictated by culture,
the likelihood that GM foods will displace developing countries'
agricultural exports, and the lack of capacity to regulate biotech-
nology.1 37 To what extent do the technical assistance and food
aid regimes take such concerns into account? In the case of
food security, for instance, it has been noted that GM crops are
likely to be more expensive to purchase and maintain, and are
134. See id. at 172-73.
135. See id. at 172.
136. See Eggers & Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 1.
137. See id at 2.
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thus unlikely to solve the problem of food security since "pov-
erty, rather than inadequate agriculture.. . remains the basis for
hunger among the people of developing countries. 1 38 Further,
because multinational corporations control biotech seeds, they
may completely dominate seed markets and farmers in develop-
ing countries.139
The provision of technical assistance includes initiatives by
the United States, 4 ° the EU, and international organizations,
such as the World Bank, to strengthen the ability of developing
countries to establish and implement science-based sanitary and
phytosanitary requirements of trading partners and to partici-
pate in the work of standard-setting organizations. Within the
context of the CPB, there are also initiatives (funded by the
United Nations Environment Program's Global Environmental
Facility ("UNEP-GEF"), international organizations, and bilat-
eral donors) to assist developing countries establish national bi-
osafety frameworks.' 41 In the case of bilateral technical assis-
tance initiatives, developed countries that favor free trade in GM
foods fund GMO research and development in developing coun-
tries, while GM food skeptics fund activities related to health and
safety regulation. 42 Thus, the United States typically funds
GMO research and development whereas the EU funds biosafety
programs. 14 3
The trouble with these initiatives is that they require devel-
oping countries to adopt the policy choices of the donors,
thereby foreclosing "public consultation and debate on the ap-
138. McDonald, supra note 43, at 522.
139. See Borg, supra note 35, at 705.
140. In the case of the United States, such technical assistance is administered by
the United States Agency for International Development ("USAID"), through its Col-
laborative Biotechnology Initiative ("CABIO"). This initiative has two main compo-
nents: the Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable Productivity Project ("ABSP"),
and the Program for Biosafety Systems ("PBS"). The objectives of the initiative are to
facilitate the commercialization of GM crops in recipient developing countries and the
establishment of regulatory regimes conducive for such commercialization. See GRAIN,
USAID: Making the World Hungy for GM Crops (2005), available at http://www.grain.org/
go/usaid.
141. See id.
142. See Stewart & Meijer, supra note 9, at 45.
143. See id. It should be noted, however, that the United States also funds biosafety
programs, for instance, in South Africa. Some commentators hold the view that the
purpose of such funding is to open up international markets for US businesses by en-
suring the adoption of weak biosafety regimes. See id. at 46.
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propriate role of biotechnology" in developing countries. 4'
The United States, which is on a mission to ensure worldwide
acceptance of GM food products, 4 5 has in particular applied bi-
lateral pressure on developing countries such as Bolivia, China,
Croatia, and Sri Lanka to adopt favorable regulations.146 In par-
ticular, the effect of technical assistance is therefore to paralyze
decision-making in developing countries, and thereby impede
their ability to address their unique concerns regarding trade in
GM food products.'4 7 In other words, because the technical as-
sistance initiatives are fragmented and often reflect different po-
sitions with regard to the development, use, and regulation of
GMOs, their impact is to impede rather than promote the ability
of developing countries to make and effectively implement their
own policies. 148
The donor countries have also used food aid to influence
the policies of developing countries, since accepting food aid
means that the affected developing countries also adopt permis-
sive regulatory policies on GM food products. The United States
is especially suspected of using food aid as leverage to promote
free trade in GM products. 49 By offering GM products in their
food aid programs, the United States is said to be seeking to pro-
mote the acceptance of these products in developing countries,
thereby expanding the markets for U.S. exporters. 150 It is in-
structive that U.S. legislation on food aid programs gives priority
to export of agricultural commodities to developing countries
that have "demonstrated the potential to become commercial
markets.' 15 1
The United States has also been accused of dumping agri-
144. Mackenzie, supra note 8, at 44.
145. See Alan P. Larson, Under-Sec'y for Econ., Bus. & Agric. Aff., Agriculture and
Biotechnology in U.S. Foreign Policy, Remarks at the Commodity Club of Washington,
D.C., Apr. 10, 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rm/2002/9307.htm.
146. See Mackenzie, supra note 8, at 46.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 45.
149. See Food Aid or Hidden Dumping?, supra note 10, at 22.
150. See Stewart & Meijer, supra note 9, at 47.
151. Food Aid or Hidden Dumping?, supra note 10, at 21-22 (citing a United States
Agency for International Development ("USAID") report stating that "of the 50 largest
customers for US agricultural goods, 43-including Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan,
and Thailand-formerly received food assistance. In short, aid leads to trade, from
which Americans stand to benefit.").
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cultural surplus through its food aid programs. 5 2 It has been
observed, for instance, that "the [U.S.] rice industry has fre-
quently turned to food aid programs as a buyer for surplus rice
production.' 1 53 Food aid programs therefore provide a "critical
escape route" for U.S. farmers "when prices are low and produc-
tion is abundant.' ' 54
Food aid also tends to displace local production since it can
flood local markets and depress prices, thereby undermining the
livelihoods of poor farmers. 155 The displacement of local pro-
duction is exacerbated where, as is increasingly the case with the
United States, food aid is monetized, that is, sold in the local
markets to generate cash. 156 So that while the GM revolution
has the potential to help alleviate the problem of hunger in de-
veloping countries, the provision of GM food aid in the current
international regulatory environment may instead increase the
developmental problems of developing countries since food aid
undermines local agricultural production systems.1 57
In such circumstances, the application of bilateral pressures
on developing countries to accept GM food aid without an ade-
quate consideration of its likely economic and environmental
impacts facilitates the adoption of narrow regulatory
frameworks. Zimbabwe's food crisis of 2001-2002 provides a
good illustration of this phenomenon. The major issue at the
heart of the crisis was whether Zimbabwe should accept GM food
aid from the United States. 5 1 While the Zimbabwe Biosafety
152. See id. at 2.
153. Id. at 19 ("In years when prices are low, food aid represents as much as
[twenty percent] of rice exports.").
154. Id.
155. See id. at 17 (giving the example of Malawi, where in the period from 2002 to
2003, food aid donors overreacted to a projected 600,000-ton food deficit and sent close
to 600,000 tons of food in aid. Because commercial and informal importers brought in
an additional 350,000-500,000 tons, Malawi was flooded and maize prices dropped from
US$250 per ton to US$100 per ton in the course of a year.).
156. See id. at 23.
157. See id. at 10 (observing that "[i]n non-emergency situations, shipping in-kind
food aid across the world to meet development needs is usually not an ideal-or even a
good-strategy for promoting development or for fighting hunger. Careful assessment
of the root causes of hunger is necessary before resorting to food aid. In most cases,
poverty or lack or income generation is the underlying cause of chronic hunger. Pro-
viding food aid is not likely to help those affected over the long term, without also
providing support for improving livelihoods.").
158. See James Keely & Ian Scoones, Contexts for Regulations: GMOs in Zimbabwe 13-
44 (U. of Sussex Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 190, 2003).
2006] 289
290 FORDHAMIATERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:265
Board ("the Board") was initially reluctant to do so on grounds
of biosafety, there was immense pressure from the World Food
Program, the United Stated Agency for International Develop-
ment ("USAID") and the U.S. State Department for Zimbabwe
to accept GM food or be accused of "crimes against human-
ity."' 59 The Board eventually caved in and agreed to accept the
GM food aid, reasoning that "on the basis of available evidence
from studies in the [United States] and 'basic understanding of
gut physiology and biochemistry' the risks of consuming [GM]
maize were not significant."16 ° But because the Board thought
that the dangers of introducing GM maize through planting
were apparent, it determined that all maize coming into the
country should be milled before distribution." 16'
It has been contended that the Board's decision to accept
GM food aid was based on an inadequate consideration of the
risks posed by the maize in question.16 2 In particular, it is ar-
gued that the decision was based on a "leap of faith," as it as-
sumed that the U.S. assessment of the safety of the maize was
sufficient. 6 ' It is pointed out that such data could not, however,
have been sufficient because it had not assessed "the conse-
quences of eating GM maize in the volumes and at the frequency
that Zimbabweans eat it. '  In the end, the decision to accept
GM maize was based on an inadequate consideration of the risks
to human health. Indeed, science took a back seat and the deci-
sion was largely based on "wider political and diplomatic" con-
siderations. 6 5
Ultimately, therefore, the provision of technical assistance
for the establishment of regulatory frameworks and food aid
both foreclose adequate public consultation and debate on the
appropriate role of biotechnology in developing countries. Fur-
ther, both demonstrate that the regulation of trade in GM food
products is a political process that needs to be democratized if
159. Id. at 13 n.9.
160. Id. at 14.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 15. Maize is Zimbabwe's main staple food and is typically eaten three
times a day. See id. at 14.
165. Id. at 15 ("With intensive lobbying behind the scenes, and high profile visits
to senior government officials and the President [of Zimbabwe] by the UN Special En-
voy Morris, the niceties of technical biosafety regulations took a back seat.").
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there is to be a sufficient consideration of their potential impacts
on human health and the environment. The need for broader
public participation in developing countries arises especially be-
cause the scientists entrusted with regulation often have an inter-
est in the commercialization of biotechnology products and may
therefore not make decisions that are in the public interest.
166
III. SCIENCE AMD DEMOCRACY IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. The Role of Science in Biotechnology Regulation
In the biotechnology context, science has largely been
deployed as the principal component in the regulatory decision-
making process. It is "sound science" that frames the scope of
biotechnology regulation, with the result that the regulatory pro-
cess may not sufficiently take social and economic considerations
into account. 167 Indeed, the undemocratic character of biotech-
nology regulation in developing countries has been attributed to
the dominance of the "sound science based free trade para-
digm. ' 168
Because science by itself cannot comprehensively address
the potential impacts of biotechnology, it is necessary to ques-
tion the paradigm that extols science at the expense of the
broader precautionary approaches that embrace other disci-
plines in the regulation of biotechnology. And if the need for a
broader participatory approach to regulation is acceptable, it
then becomes necessary to examine the role and nature of de-
mocracy (that is accountability and participation) in the process
of biotechnology regulation. This is because in biotechnology as
well as in other contexts, democracy facilitates the making of
"better-informed, more appropriate, and ultimately more effec-
tive policies.' '1 6 9
A number of scholars have analyzed the role science plays in
biotechnology regulation in developing countries. Dominic
Glover thus observes that in practice the processes of scientific
166. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Ian Scoones, Science, Policy and Regulation: Challenges for Agricultural
Biotechnology in Developing Countries (U. of Sussex Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper
No. 147, 2002) [hereinafter Science, Policy and Regulation].
168. Id.
169. Glover, supra note 12, at 9.
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risk assessment and public participation are separated.17 ° The
scientists carry out the risk assessments, which form the basis for
decision-making, and then inform the public.171 Science is
therefore deemed to be dispositive in matters of biotechnology
regulation, and public participation is just but a "technical input
to [science-based] rational decision making processes." '172 This,
he argues, is also the approach adopted in the CPB's concept of
"biosafety," for instance, which is concerned with "the manage-
ment of the risks associated with the contained use and environ-
mental release of GMOs." 7v In his view, "biosafety is based im-
plicitly on . .. the assumption that environmental and human
health risks associated with GMOs can be identified, evaluated
and controlled by science." '74 Further, Glover argues that be-
cause it is science that frames the implications of GMOs by deter-
mining what factors are to be deemed "relevant from a regula-
tory point of view," the resulting decision-making framework is
therefore quite narrow.17 5
This approach to regulatory decision-making also assumes
that "the public will naturally accept the judgments of science as
soon as it can be made to understand them." 7 6 It is thus quite
paternalistic, as "scientists construe the public as ignorant, and
attribute [its] failure to embrace science to fear and misunder-
standing founded on ignorance or irrationality."' 77 Accordingly,
"the public will naturally accept the judgments of science as soon
170. See id at 4; see also Science, Policy and Regulation, supra note 167, at 9 ("[F]ormal
risk assessment is deemed to be a delimited, technical exercise, one where inputs from
objective science are seen to be crucial. With the separation of technical from political,
moral, or ethical dimensions this, in turn, allows for a demarcated role for technical
expertise which is seen to be independent and objective.").
171. See Glover, supra note 12, at 6 ("[IT] here is a strong and pervasive assumption
that public consultations are to take place in separate processes [and, in particular,
subsequent to] .. .scientific risk assessments of GMOs.").
172. Id. at 7.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Glover, supra note 12, at 6; see also Ian Scoones, Regulatory Manoeuvres: The Bt
Cotton Controversy in India n. I (U. of Sussex Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No.
197, 2003) [hereinafter Regulatory Manoeuvres] ("[T]he framing of the regulatory de-
bate is key. If it is kept narrow, science-focused and risk-oriented, then key elements of
the debate are not on the table. If it is broadened and made more inclusive, then the
remit of regulatory deliberations widens.").
176. Glover, supra note 12, at 7.
177. Id.
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as it can be made to understand them. 17 a
The CPB 179 conceptualizes public participation largely in
terms of providing information to the public rather than as a
"strategic opportunity to make informed, legitimate and effec-
tive policies."' 0 Thus, the role of the public is to be a passive
recipient of information about biotechnology, and their igno-
rance is to be cured through education and awareness-raising
activities. Because the public is invited to "participate" only after
science has made the value judgments, the space for public par-
ticipation is circumscribed."8 ' The public does not therefore get
an opportunity to help frame the scope of regulation. 1 2
Further, the science-based approach to regulatory decision-
making is questionable since science is not only "heavily con-
tested," but the risk assessment methodologies typically adopted
also have significant limitations.8 3 Ian Scoones argues, for ex-
ample, that in practice "sound science" is not sound because
"conventional risk assessment approaches are often ill-equipped
to deal with multiple criteria and incommensurability, where sci-
entific uncertainties, indeterminacy and ignorance prevail." ' 4
In his view, "standard risk assessment procedures are usually
based on the assessment of a limited number of criteria where
technical assessments are seen to be sufficient" due to "limited
178. Id.
179. CPB, art. 23 provides, inter alia, that:
1. The Parties shall:
(a) Promote and facilitate public awareness, education and participation con-
cerning the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms
in relation to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity,
taking also into account risks to human health. In doing so, the Parties
shall cooperate, as appropriate, with other States and international bod-
ies;
(b) Endeavour to ensure that public awareness and education encompass ac-
cess to information on living modified organisms identified in accordance
with this Protocol that may be imported.
2. The Parties shall, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations,
consult the public in the decision-making process regarding living modified
organisms and shall make the results of such decisions available to the public,
while respecting confidential information in accordance with Article 21.
CPB, supra note 107, art. 23.
180. Glover, supra note 12, at 2-3.
181. See id. at 13.
182. See Glover, supra note 12, at 13.
183. Science, Policy and Regulation, supra note 167, at 15.
184. Id. at 9.
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budgets, staff and skill shortages and short-time frames." 8 ' As a
result, "more complex criteria are left out of the equation, un-
certainties are 'black boxed,' and areas of ignorance avoided."' 6
Risk assessment procedures are therefore only able "to look at
relatively short-term impacts," and the hope is that "longer term
and broader scale impacts will be picked up through monitoring
later on.' 8 7
Scoones further argues that risk assessment processes are
dominated by molecular biologists, who possess "little interest in
and knowledge of complex ecological processes. 18 8 As a result,
the risk assessment procedures employed ignore the considera-
tion of wider ecological impacts of biotechnology products.'
Consequently, the biotechnology regulation debate is, in prac-
tice, framed by particular disciplines of science at the expense of
others, with the effect that the scientific debate around risk as-
sessment becomes "highly fragmented."'' 0 In addition, he notes
that scientists disagree on how field trials should be designed:
while agronomists favor "simple plot based" experiments, ecosys-
tems ecologists argue for broader experiments to assess the "like-
lihood of complex responses at an ecosystem level." ''
Another notable concern relates to the influence of the bio-
technology industry over biotechnology regulatory policy. 92 Pe-
ter Newell and Dominic Glover argue that "the imperative of fa-
cilitating the commercialization of GM products has been al-
lowed to override a fuller [regulatory] consideration of the
potential environmental and socio-economic risks associated
with GM crops. '  Because of such influence, "[b]iotechnology
regulations have responded more to commercial and trade con-
cerns than to public anxiety about environmental and social
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Regulatory Manoeuvres, supra note 175, at 34.
188. Id. at 35.
189. See id.
190. Id. ("Those with access to the regulatory system frame the issue in one way
(largely around genetic, molecular and chemical issues), and in so doing blackbox a
whole range of uncertainties.").
191. See Science, Policy and Regulation, supra note 167, at 21.
192. See generally Peter Newell & Dominic Glover, Business and Biotechnology: Regula-
tion and the Politics of Influence (U. of Sussex Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No.
192, 2003).
193. Id. at 5.
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risks." '194 Newell and Glover base this argument on their obser-
vations of international harmonization of biotechnology regula-
tion and capacity-building initiatives.' 95
The idea behind the international harmonization initiatives
is to "reduce barriers to trade by creating common standards
and rules of conduct."' 96 In this case, Newell and Glover observe
that the biotechnology industry has been "keen to ensure that
decision-making is technical and devoid of political conflict as
[much as] possible," and has "expressed concern about widen-
ing the regulatory circle too far, both in terms of the actors in-
volved and the range of issues considered."'9 7 Because the bio-
technology industry funds many of these initiatives, it has sought
the promulgation of regulatory frameworks that are suitable for
its commercialization objectives. For example, the international
harmonization initiatives seek the acceptance of the principle of
substantial equivalence for the regulation of GM food prod-
ucts.
1 9 8
The biotechnology industry has also played a prominent
role, especially in the UNEP-GEF pilot biosafety programs.'99 As
Newell and Glover note, however, industry has been "reluctant
to meet developing-country requests for financial support unless
[it is assured that its] views and concerns will also be taken on
board."20 0
In view of these realities of biotechnology regulation, espe-
cially in developing countries, some scholars have called for the
development of more participatory and comprehensive ap-
proaches that address scientific uncertainty in transparent
ways.2 1' The following section makes a case for the adoption of
194. Id. at 4 (concluding that much contemporary regulation thus "provides regu-
lation for business rather than regulation of business.").
195. See id. at 6-8.
196. Id. at 9. There is "a set of global pressures" to establish internationally harmo-
nized regulatory frameworks consisting of the OECD, leading biotechnology companies
and the "Miami Group" (the leading GM foods exporters, namely Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Chile, the United States, and Uruguay). See id. at 9-10.
197. Id. (noting, for instance, that "during the negotiation of the Biosafety Proto-
col, industry sought to resist the attempt by countries such as Ethiopia and Malaysia to
insert language that would have allowed States to evaluate the socio-economic impacts
of GMOs in their risk assessments.").
198. See id. at 10.
199. See id. at 15.
200. Id. at 7.
201. See Science, Policy and Regulation, supra note 167, at 3.
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such participatory frameworks.
B. Enhancing Public Participation in Biotechnology Regulation
If the citizens of developing countries are to play a more
effective role in the regulation of biotechnology, there is thus a
need to explore alternatives to the prevailing expert model. In
particular, biotechnology regulation-as in other regulatory con-
texts-must be recognized for what it is, that is, a political exer-
cise whose object is to reconcile different rationales in the pro-
cess of conceiving what is good for society. Further, expertise
does not take politics out of the decision-making process be-
cause experts often have their own biases. In the case of biotech-
nology regulation in developing countries, for example, the ex-
perts entrusted with regulation are often proponents of the com-
mercialization of GM food products and therefore unlikely to
make objective decisions.20 2 Furthermore, scientists are often in-
fluenced by the agencies that fund their research. 20 ' Accord-
ingly, it must be appreciated that expertise "can only illuminate
choices, not decide them. '20 4 That is, expertise simply helps to
forecast the costs and consequences of particular policy choices.
Furthermore, given that competing interests will be affected dif-
ferently by any regulatory decision, expertise is unlikely to legiti-
mate the decision, especially where it calls for value judg-
ments.
20 5
In the interests of governmental legitimacy and balanced al-
location of values in the regulatory process, all those likely to be
affected by any proposed regulation ought to be meaningfully
involved in its formulation and implementation. The concept of
legitimacy implicates the inclusiveness and public acceptance of
governmental decision-making processes. Thus, in a democracy,
governmental decisions should result from the deliberation of
all if they are to be legitimate. 20 6 The regulatory challenges
presented by biotechnology should accordingly be seen as
202. See Stewart & Meijer, supra note 9, at 25.
203. See Science, Policy and Regulation, supra note 167, at 5.
204. MICHAEL REAGAN, REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 2 (1987).
205. See ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 80 (1999).
206. See Jack Knight & James Johnson, What Sort of Political Equality Does Deliberative
Democracy Require?, in DEIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 279,
280 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
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problems of social choice that scientific experts alone cannot re-
solve legitimately. The process of biotechnology regulation
should therefore be politicized to ensure that the various com-
peting interests participate in decision-making.
One key means of politicizing biotechnology regulation
would be for developing countries to implement a "deliberative
democracy" model. 20 1 "Deliberative democracy" sees democracy
"not simply in terms of popular will and decision, but as a form
of legitimation of power that depends on a conception of public
justification and deliberative reason. "208 Under this approach,
the role of science would not be to "trump citizens' intuitive
judgments about which risks are acceptable and which not, but
rather to help ensure that citizens' judgments result from an ap-
propriately structured deliberative process. "209
There will, of course, be obstacles to the realization of such
a deliberative approach to biotechnology regulation. For in-
stance, many developing countries face considerable resource
constraints. 210 Nevertheless, developing countries stand to gain
much from investing in biotechnology, and should thus devote
more resources to biotechnology processes in their budgetary al-
locations. But they should do so in a regulatory context that suf-
ficiently considers the needs and concerns of their citizens. Per-
haps more importantly, the implementation of a deliberative ap-
proach promises to empower the citizens of developing
countries, thereby enabling their governments to better manage
the bilateral pressures that accompany the provision of technical
assistance and food aid in the context of international regulation
of GM food products.
CONCLUSION
The international framework for the regulation of trade in
GM food products does not establish clear rules, and has led to
the utilization of bilateral political and economic pressures by
developed countries in their efforts to prevail upon developing
207. Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the
World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2330 (2000).
208. Id. at 2334.
209. Howse, supra note 207, at 2335; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Pildes,
Experts, Economists and Democrats, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 128 (Cass R. Sun-
stein ed., 1997).
210. See Howse, supra note 207, at 2339.
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countries to adopt favorable regulatory approaches. The appli-
cation of these pressures has been facilitated by the WTO's spe-
cial and differential treatment regime, under which developed
countries provide technical assistance and food aid to develop-
ing countries. These pressures greatly compromise the establish-
ment of democratic regulatory policies in developing countries.
Further, they present conflicting regulatory approaches thereby
impeding the ability of developing countries to formulate and
implement their own policies.
For these reasons, developing countries need to enhance
public participation in biotechnology regulation. As we have
seen, however, existing biotechnology regulation frameworks in
these countries largely circumscribe the space for public partici-
pation, such that the public does not get an opportunity to help
frame the scope of regulation. This approach to public partici-
pation needs rethinking for three reasons. First, the impact of
GM food products is likely to vary across countries and requires
country-specific responses that address local concerns and
needs. Accordingly, safety assessments for one country may not
suffice for others and standardized tool-kit approaches to regula-
tion that preclude public participation are not appropriate. The
public should therefore be given a meaningful opportunity to
debate the likely impacts of GM food products on their health
and environment. Broadening public participation will thus fa-
cilitate a comprehensive consideration of the impacts of these
products. Second, public participation promises to facilitate na-
tional governance and therefore constitutes a key mechanism
for the citizens of developing countries to manage the processes
of globalization. Finally, and perhaps more significantly, in the
context of trade in GM food products, public participation may
rescue the governments of developing countries from bilateral
pressures to adopt regulatory frameworks that only serve the in-
terests of donor countries.
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